Hi! I will participate in the Spanish track of the GlobalAzure event, I will talk about security, AzureAD and best practices. If you want to knowmore, check out the agenda: https://globalazure.es/#schedule
Currently, we could say that Legacy Authentication is one of the most compromising sign-in, luckily for us, older protocols have been replacing with modern authentication services, taking the advantage that MA supports MFA, while Legacy Authentication refers to all protocols that use Basic Authentication, and only requires one method of authentication.
So, it is important thar for security reasons we need to disable legacy authentication in our environments, why? Because enabling MFA isn’t effective if legacy protocols are not blocked. For example, the following options are considered legacy authentication protocols:
- Authenticated SMTP – Used by POP and IMAP clients to send email messages.
- Autodiscover – Used by Outlook and EAS clients to find and connect to mailboxes in Exchange Online.
- Exchange ActiveSync (EAS) – Used to connect to mailboxes in Exchange Online.
- Exchange Online PowerShell – Used to connect to Exchange Online with remote PowerShell. If you block Basic authentication for Exchange Online PowerShell, you need to use the Exchange Online PowerShell Module to connect.
- Exchange Web Services (EWS) – A programming interface that’s used by Outlook, Outlook for Mac, and third-party apps.
- IMAP4 – Used by IMAP email clients.
- MAPI over HTTP (MAPI/HTTP) – Used by Outlook 2010 and later.
- Offline Address Book (OAB) – A copy of address list collections that are downloaded and used by Outlook.
- Outlook Anywhere (RPC over HTTP) – Used by Outlook 2016 and earlier.
- Outlook Service – Used by the Mail and Calendar app for Windows 10.
- POP3 – Used by POP email clients.
- Reporting Web Services – Used to retrieve report data in Exchange Online.
- Other clients – Other protocols identified as utilizing legacy authentication
How can we monitor the usage of legacy authentication in Azure AD?
Thanks to Log Analytics, Insights and workbooks, we are able to monitor the use of those protocols, for instance:
And check the non-interactive sign-ins (be careful with ADConnect sync accounts):
What we can do to avoid this?
The best way to block or report legacy authentication for users is use Conditional Access policies (Does my organization need Azure AD Conditional Access? – Albandrod’s Memory (albandrodsmemory.com) & Enabling zero trust security in your environment – Albandrod’s Memory (albandrodsmemory.com)
But the best way is creating a CA policy:
My final advice
Legacy authentication must be disabled to protect our environments, but first, start small and analyse the impact in your organization.
Till next time!
This is a second part of my blog about reviewing Fido2 Keys from Feitian (PassWordless Authentication with Fido 2 Keys – Albandrod’s Memory (albandrodsmemory.com))
In this case, I am testing out the K33 and K44 products
The initial setup of the tenant is covered in my previous post, so I will skip the details of how to do it.
To configure the K33 key you will need to download the app “BioPass FIDO2 Manager” from the Windows Store:
And connect your K33 key via USB to the laptop (otherwise won’t be possible to configure), the configure your preferred PIN, and finally configure your fingerprints. The process to the K44 is similar, but in this case, I am using and Ipad, and the app to download is “iePassManager”
Once the two keys are configured, you’re ready to setup them in AzureAD MFA (https://aka.ms/setupmfa)
I have explained the process of how to initially configure the K33 key, but I strongly recommend to follow the steps mentioned in K33_Microsoft_Services_Guide.pdf (ftsafe.com) to pair the key with your laptop.
Once the key has been paired, the process to configure it is simple, the only thing that you must take into account is that even it is Bluetooth Key, you must configure it as an USB key (but remember, it must be paired first with the device).
Authentication with K33
K44 Registration Process
Once again, it is needed to set up the PIN for the Key, in my case, it has been done with the Ipad, but the registration process, is easy as the video shows:
The sign in process is very similar as we’ve seen before, so I do not want to cover this, but as you can observe, the registration and use of Fido2 Keys is pretty simple.
Inclusion, MFA keys and particularly, Fido2 Keys from Feitian are great!! But now, something that you must consider when implementing Fido2 keys in your environment:
There’s no way to enforce PIN policy in Azure AD: Every user can set up their own PIN to use their key. There is no centralized way to manage PINs, but Windows Hello for Business blocks simple PIN codes by default. The bad news is, if you add the key directly to your Azure AD account, these settings are overridden ☹
Feitian offers multiple options for connecting your key, so you’re sure to find one that works for you. Among the available connections are USB-A, USB-C, NFC, Bluetooth, PIN, biometrics, and more.
Biometrics requires app installation: you need to download the manufacturers’ application that enables fingerprint scanning, which is additional software that you must consider to install
Again, I want to thanks Feitian for providing the security keys to test out the use cases
Till next time!
Nobody can doubt that 2021 has been the year to adopt the cloud (due to COVID of course), mostly because most of us needed to work from home. We can say that business has changed and “Probably” will never go back to was it was.
Remote work will continue growing, so in 2022 we will need to protect our assets much better, and for this, here are my predictions/concerns for the next year:
- Hacker will continue to try to breach in our systems and try to access by the weak link in supply chains. For this, we need to reduce privileges for internal and external accounts, and not forget about machine identities
- Every business needs to reduce his own Attack Surface, to reduce the blast radius of any exposure or incident. To achieve this, tools that provide visibility into identities and activities are essential, we need to be sure of what happened and respond quickly to those incidents
- Protect the data is your responsibility, try to plan and build security controls for your cloud migration roadmap
- Zero Trust will continue growing, but remember to keep in touch with all the components: network, identity, permissions, configurations… The need of tools that give visibility is essential here.
- Currently we put the focus on protecting our user identity with MFA controls, but what about machine identities? These identities and permissions are being exploited in every breach to make lateral attacks, so we will need to be aware of that during the next year.
For now, I think that it’s all, stay tuned to the blog and happy new year!
The following are recommendations and thoughts that I extracted by working with several customers, maybe you will find it obvious, but for other people could be useful. So, let’s begin:
In the identity plane, we could say that exists 2 categories:
- Resist Common attacks
- Contain successful attacks
I don’t want to enter of how to resist or contain attacks, because probably I covered some of these topics in other blog entries, but for me, there is another category which is: understand the human nature.
Nothing more that understand that almost every rule that we impose to the end users, result in degradation of security. Why? Because we force users to use long passwords, with special characters, and in the end, users tend to reuse passwords which makes easier to guess or crack passwords for malicious actors.
So, in the post I will resume some of my experiences as AntiPatterns and recommendations:
- Antipattern – Requiring long passwords: excessive length passwords (more than 10 characters) can result in a behaviour predictable, users tend to choose repeating patterns (heyholetsgoheyholetsgo) that meet the character length but clearly not hard to guess. We can say that this kind of passwords are hard to guess but lead to poor behaviours to guess the password.
- SuperPRO Tip: You can use a long password, but in this case what I recommend is something that engineers from Microsoft do. They use a very loooooooong password, they forget it, and instead of it, they use passwordless mechanisms such as Windows Hello to sign in.
My tip: Use minimum 8 length requirement but ban common passwords with Azure AD Password Protection.
- Antipattern – Require use of multiple character sets: probably you’re not in the same line as me, but I’ve seen that this rule do more harm than good. People use patterns as substitutions such as $ for s, @ for a, 1 for I. So keep it in mind
- Antipattern – Password expiration: Policy expiration drive users to use very predictable password (for example, the next password can be predicted on the previous password), end users do not tend to use a new password, the tend to update the old one.
My tip for the two previous points: Azure AD Password Protection + Conditional Access based on User Identity
- Recommendation – Ban common passwords: For me, the most important restriction is to ban the use of common password to reduce the possibility of brute force or password spray attacks
Tip: Look at my first tip 😊
- Recommendation – Educate end Users not to use organization credentials anywhere else: Yes I know that educate users are difficult, but you have to do it, because the tend to reuse the same password across multiple sites. It is a common practice for cyber criminals to try compromised credentials across many sites.
- Recommendation – Enforce MFA registration and enable MFA: ensure that users maintain their security information up to date, so they can respond to security challenges if needed. Doing this, I have seen that end users are more implicated concerning digital security
Enabling MFA prevents up to 99.9% of identity attacks, and if we use other controls such as user location, the better.
PRO TIP: Use Conditional access with FIDO2 security key (PassWordless Authentication with Fido 2 Keys – Albandrod’s Memory (albandrodsmemory.com))
EndUser TIP: Consider turning on two-step verification everywhere you can
- Recommendation – Enable risk-based Authentication: when the system detects suspicious activity, it challenges the user to ensure that they are the legitimate account owner. Personally, I think that this feature is great, but the only drawback that it is only included with AAD P2
Probably you will have different ones based on your experience but these are my recommendations. Till next time and stay safe!
If you want to audit or strenght your security posture in AzureAD, OnPrem or M365, Microsoft has published a guide with which points you have to tweak in order to improve your (or your customers) security: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-introduction
While I was doing a PoC about Defender For Identity in one of my costumers, I decided to take one step further and try to work with all the Defender capabilities enabled in the VM.
In this case, I was preparing Defender for Identity, but also Defender for EndPoint was enabled on the VM, so… I started playing:
The first thing, is when I tried to run mimikatz on the VM:
I leaved intentionally Windows Defender on, and not only it blocked the program, it was erased from the VM, so first thing cool.
Also, this execution fires some alerts in the defender for endpoint portal:
Wow, a lot of information to start… So iesn order to carry on my tests, it was necesary to deactivate Windows Defender Protection:
But once I have everything in place, and I have executed my test, what I can see from the different security products is the following:
Azure Defender has been talking a lot with all the products, firing a lot of alerts in my environment, I have to say that not only I have Defender for Identity, also Defender for Endpoint and Sentinel, so all my alerts are being correlated in my workspace.
So I can dig into the alerts in order to know what is really happening in my environment:
For me, all the variants of Defender & Sentinel, are great tools to protect our environments from external threats 🙂
This post will be quick, if you haven’t heard about PrintNightmare take a look to this article: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/public-windows-printnightmare-0-day-exploit-allows-domain-takeover/
In order to avoid some ransom in our companies, just disable the service Print Spoler on WIndows 10 and Windows Server environments.
In order to do that, just open a PS as an admin and run the following:
Stop-Service -Name Spooler -Force #prevent the service from starting again during restart Set-Service -Name Spooler -StartupType Disabled
That’s all! take care!
Nowadays business are being compromised by an Office pop up asking them to grant permissions to what that looks like a normal Office app. But, when you click on accept, you’re unknowingly providing a bad actor’s application access to your contact info, mailbox settings, and sign-in access.
The following action is to impersonate the victim, sending emails and accessing to their files in their behalf, and thus this application are external to the organization, the attacker can access to the account info without MFA.
Scary stuff that you probably want to avoid, isn’t it?
What can I do to prevent the attack?
In order to reduce this risk, you can change the configuration of your tenant to only install applications that are approved by an admin. Also keep in mind a hardening of the tenant. By doing this, you will avoid some problems in the future
How I can detect those actions?
Want to see if you’ve had this happen already?
- Open the Security & Compliance Center at https://protection.office.com.
- Navigate to Search and select Audit log search.
- Search (all activities and all users) and enter the start date and end date if required and then click Search.
- Click Filter results and enter Consent to application in the Activity field.
- Click on the result to see the details of the activity. Click More Information to get details of the activity. Check to see if IsAdminContent is set to True.
How I can respond to those attacks?
If you have identified an application with illicit permissions, you can revoke the applications permission in the AAD portal:
- You can revoke the application’s permission in the Azure Active Directory Portal by:
- Navigate to the affected user in the Azure Active Directory User blade.
- Select Applications.
- Select the illicit application.
- Click Remove in the drill down. Then, do reconnassaince on any accounts that had consented to the app, resetting their password, requiring MFA, and digging through Cloud App Security and other logging tools to find out what has been done in the account. Look for phishing emails sent to other users in the organization and to the contact lists, files accessed on OneDrive or SharePoint, etc.
Most of the time, when we are talking about security in M365, we talk about how to encrypt files and give permission to those files. But… did you know you can Protect a document in SharePoint and OneDrive from being accidentally altered or overwritten? What I can say that It is a very useful feature when autosave is enabled in Excel or Word files.
But… What key points do you need to know?
- You can only protect individual documents, not a complete document library.
- You can not protect OneNote documents, in desktop nor online nor that half-baked OneNote for Windows 10.
- In the desktop apps you can protect Word, Excel and PowerPoint documents against overwriting.
(You can also use other ways of protection, but that is out-of-scope for now)
- In the online apps you can only protect Word and Excel, but not PowerPoint.
- You can protect Word and Excel files in SharePoint and OneDrive.
- You can only send with “review-only” in Word, not in Excel, PowerPoint or OneNote (I hope that in the future this will change).
- You can only send with “review-only” when you share with “people you specify” or “people in your tenant with the link”.
- You can use “review-only” in Word in SharePoint and OneDrive.
- When you share the document from SharePoint with an external person who has no access to the site, they receive a code via mail as soon as they try to open the document.
- How does a Word-document open, and which options do you have when you share the document with or without protection, with our without “review-only” and with people with various roles in your SharePoint site? See the table below. The first word is the option that the document opens with.